The NFT community has been humming in 2023 after the recent rise in Bitcoin NFT mints. Ordinals, a non-fungible token (“NFT”) protocol, sent the community buzzing in January 2023 when it launched on the Bitcoin blockchain (as updated by soft forks in the protocol in 2017 and 2021, which among other things, added new features to the blockchain and increased the block size from 1MB to 4MB and allowed for the inscription of data). Bitcoin evangelists – true believers in Bitcoin as hard money – appreciate that the Bitcoin blockchain’s development is optimized for non-censorable, decentralized money but not file storage and consider Ordinals as immutable JPEG garbage that will only create network congestion, thereby increasing fees, and should be viewed as beneath the original peer-to-peer mission. Conversely, NFT enthusiasts and the blockchain curious are celebrating Bitcoin’s NFT scene as an innovative use of the chain: unlike traditional Ethereum-based NFTs (where the original underlying asset generally resides on a centralized server or the IPFS), Ordinals reside on-chain.  Needless to say, the rise of NFTs on the original blockchain is not without questions.

This article is Part I of a two-part article on Ordinals. In this part, we will break down Ordinals, explaining Ordinal Theory, ins-and-outs and functions. In Part II, we will dive into the implications of having NFTs on two separate blockchains.

A recent guilty plea in U.S. v. Wahi in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York, a crypto insider trading case, sets up an interesting situation where the defendants — who have already pled guilty to wire fraud — are challenging the SEC’s parallel civil charges

Customer lists held by providers and the personal information users enter to obtain digital wallets or set up crypto exchange accounts are enviable targets for hackers.  Such data can be used to launch targeted phishing schemes and related scams to trick holders into divulging their private keys or else unknowingly transferring anonymized crypto assets to hackers.  One recent case involves a suit brought by customers who purchased a hardware wallet to secure cryptocurrency assets and are seeking redress for harms they allegedly suffered following data breaches that exposed their personal information.

A recent Ninth Circuit decision analyzed whether a federal court had personal jurisdiction over a foreign crypto asset wallet provider, an issue that can be important when litigating in this area, given the boundary-less nature of the world of crypto assets and related services. (Baton v. Ledger SAS, No. 21-17036 (9th Cir. Dec. 1, 2022) (unpublished)). 

At a time when states are jockeying for position to become digital asset and cryptocurrency hubs and we’ve witnessed turmoil and regulatory uncertainty within the cryptoasset industry, the New York Department of Financial Services (“NYDFS”) on December 15, 2022 released its final Guidance (the “Guidance”) to banking organizations seeking to engage in “new or significantly different” virtual currency-related activities. As stated in the Guidance, “virtual currency-related activity” includes all “virtual currency business activity,” as defined under the BitLicense regulation (23 NYCRR § 200.2(q)), as well as “the direct or indirect offering or performance of any other product, service, or activity involving virtual currency that may raise safety and soundness concerns for the Covered Institution or that may expose New York customers of the Covered Institution or other users of the product or service to risk of harm.” At a high level, the Guidance reminds state-regulated banks (“Covered Institutions”) that, as a “matter of safety and soundness,” they must apply for approval before engaging in digital asset-related activities and outlines the types of information the NYDFS deems most relevant in assessing a proposal and the potential risks that such virtual currency-related activities may pose for the institution, consumers and the market in general (note: The Guidance expressly states that it does not interpret existing laws nor take a position on the sorts of activities that may be permissible for Covered Institutions to take).

Notably, the Guidance further increases the scope of NYDFS oversight by expanding the types of virtual currency activity requiring approval: “virtual currency-related activities” must receive approval, whereas previously only “virtual currency business activity” required prior approval from the NYDFS.  In a footnote, the Guidance explains the difference – virtual currency-related activity” essentially means any “virtual currency business activity” as defined under the BitLicense rules, plus certain additional activities that the NYDFS believes might raise “safe and soundness concerns.”

At 2:43am EST on September 15, 2022, the first Ethereum block was validated using Proof of Stake, signaling the success of the Ethereum Merge, one of the most anticipated events in blockchain and computer science history. The Merge shifted the Ethereum blockchain (native token ETH, or ether) from a proof-of-work (PoW) consensus mechanism to a proof-of-stake (PoS) consensus mechanism, which has reduced the network’s energy usage by about 99.5%. Ethereum now facilitates a 7-day average of over one-million transactions per day, at a volume of over $600 million per day, making the Merge an engineering feat akin to swapping a car’s engine while it’s driving on the Autobahn.

In late October, a New York district court refused to dismiss the Department of Justice’s (DOJ) indictment against defendant Nathaniel Chastain, who was charged with wire fraud and money laundering relating to his using insider knowledge to purchase non-fungible tokens (NFTs) prior to them being featured on OpenSea, an online NFT marketplace, and later selling them at a profit. (U.S. v. Chastain, No. 22-cr-305 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 21, 2022)). Despite the headlines and the fact that the DOJ’s press release labeled this enforcement as charges brought in “the first ever digital asset insider trading scheme,” the Chastain indictment was not actually based on the typical insider trading statutes involving securities law violations, but instead the federal wire fraud statute.  Indeed, despite having an insider trading flavor, the word “security” does not appear in the indictment and the court, in refusing to dismiss the DOJ’s wire fraud claim, ruled that the Government’s wire fraud claim does not require the presence of a “security.”

On October 3, 2022, the Financial Stability Oversight Council (“FSOC”) – a collaborative body formed under the Dodd-Frank Act composed of state and federal regulators and tasked with identifying risks and responding to emerging threats to financial stability – released its 100+-page Report on Digital Asset Financial Stability Risks and Regulation (the “Report”). In the Report – a response to President Biden’s Executive Order 14067 on digital assets, which, among other things, directed various agencies to promote innovation and R&D while calling for measures to mitigate risks – the FSOC reviewed what it deems to be, “specific financial stability risks and regulatory gaps posed by various types of digital assets.”

At the core, the FSOC Report is a call to arms, with the council citing what it sees as a host of regulatory and industry shortfalls that have not kept up with the rapid growth of digital asset activities.  For example:

  • The FSOC report noted that stablecoins and the lending and borrowing on digital asset trading platforms are now an “important emerging vulnerability.”
  • The Report’s basic thesis is that crypto-asset activities “could pose risks to the stability of the U.S. financial system if their interconnections with the traditional financial system or their overall scale were to grow without being paired with appropriate regulation, including enforcement of the existing regulatory structure.” This point was reiterated in the Federal Reserve’s November 2022 “Financial Stability Report,” which presents the Federal Reserve Board’s current assessment of the stability of the U.S. financial system.
  • The FSOC Report also expresses the position that federal comprehensive digital asset legislation is needed to address complex, systemic economic risks, as, in its opinion, “many crypto-asset platforms are not registered or chartered under regulatory frameworks that would address these risks.”