It is not unusual for users of a platform or of software to challenge the enforceability of a company’s terms of use if they take issue with the company’s product or service and decide to bring suit. As most terms of use contain an arbitration clause (or mandated dispute resolution process) and disclaimers of liability, the questions of user assent to and the overall enforceability of the terms of use become central issues early on in litigation. In each case, judges adjudicating legal challenges to site terms generally examine the circumstances behind the online contracting process closely – scrutinizing the user interface, the presentation of the terms and the reasonableness of the relevant provisions governing the transactions or online accounts at issue. In some instances, courts have ruled that online terms were unenforceable for a variety of reasons, often owing to the non-conspicuous presentation of the terms or that the terms themselves were in some way unconscionable or otherwise unenforceable. In one recent case, however, a federal judge in Georgia rejected a challenge brought by users of cryptocurrency exchange platform Coinbase Global, Inc. (“Coinbase”) and found Coinbase’s terms enforceable. (Kattula v. Coinbase Global, Inc., No. 22-3250 (N.D. Ga. July 6, 2023)).

Unlike traditional corporate entities with a typical hierarchical structure, a decentralized autonomous organization (“DAO”) – a management structure that uses blockchain technology – functions as a leaderless entity. Without a formal corporate structure, DAOs instead operate by distributing governance rights among persons who hold a specific governance token. Consequently, federal and state courts have been grappling with how to consider a DAO under existing laws that were traditionally interpreted against long-standing corporate entities.

As discussed in a prior post, DAOs allow individuals to organize and coordinate at arms-length, and rely on code (a “protocol”) to govern and execute functions traditionally determined by governing documents, like operating agreements and articles of formation, and undertaken by executives. A DAO’s protocol is committed to a public ledger on a blockchain, which guarantees accessibility and transparency. Each member is granted governance rights – the ability to propose and approve initiatives, called proposals – through a governance token. In light of their unique makeup, DAOs lack centralized leadership and a typical top-down management structure.

Accordingly, parties have debated whether a DAO should be recognized as a general partnership under state corporation laws (i.e., N.Y. P’ship Law §10: “an association of two or more persons to carry on as co-owners a business for profit….”) or, in the case of the Commodity Futures Trading Commission’s (“CFTC”) Ooki DAO enforcement, whether a DAO could be deemed an “unincorporated association” under the Commodity Exchange Act (“CEA”). Following the filing of the CFTC’s enforcement action, it is not surprising that the structure of the Ooki DAO, and the CFTC’s enforcement action against the DAO itself, has garnered a lot of media attention and industry reaction, and has raised novel legal issues.

Several questions have arisen in recent years regarding the potential liability of DAO members:

  • While DAOs are emerging as a viable structure in the DeFi space, does their non-traditional makeup necessarily shield them from real world liability?
  • Does a DAO’s structure render its activities “enforcement proof” or, at the very least, difficult to effect traditional service of process upon?
  • Can a DAO be an “unincorporated association” under federal or state law?
  • Who should be liable for the decisions made by a DAO?
  • Because token holders participate in the DAO’s governance, can they be deemed personally liable for its actions (akin to the general partners in a general partnership), even if each governance token holder is essentially unknown to the other DAO members, who likely reside in multiple jurisdictions?

The SEC suffered a significant loss last week in its ongoing legal battle with Ripple over the XRP digital token. While the District Court held that Ripple’s initial sales of XRP to institutional investors constituted the sale of unregistered securities, it was a Pyrrhic victory as the court held…

In a post-FTX environment, several financial regulators are taking action to emphasize a policy of sound custody and disclosure practices and to better understand certain risks to protect customers in the event of an insolvency or similar proceeding. For example, back in January 2023, the New York Department of Financial Services announced that it had issued certain Guidance on Custodial Structures for Customer Protection in the Event of Insolvency in which it highlighted the significance of consumer protection upon insolvency or similar proceeding. And in February 2023, the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) proposed amendments to the Custody Rule under the Investment Advisers Act of 1940, which, among other changes, clarified aspects of the existing rule and expanded its application to a broader array of client assets managed by registered investment advisers.

This past month, the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (“CFTC”) acted to ensure proper risk management within the derivatives markets in relation to, among other things, digital assets, by issuing two separate releases: (1) a proposed rulemaking on potential amendments to certain Risk Management Program (“RMP”) requirements applicable to swap dealers (“SDs”), major swap participants (“MSPs”), and futures commission merchants (“FCMs”); and (2) an advisory letter reminding derivatives clearing organization (“DCO”) registrants and DCO applicants about compliance obligations when expanding the types of products cleared and services offered by DCOs, including those related to digital assets.  The CFTC stated that re-evaluating its risk management rules is necessary to keep pace with evolving markets that can give rise to new risks from emerging technologies such as digital assets and artificial intelligence.

On 8 June 2023, the UK Financial Conduct Authority (“FCA”) published a policy statement (PS23/6) on the financial promotion rules for cryptoassets (the “Policy Statement”). This is accompanied by a guidance consultation (GC23/1), where the FCA is seeking feedback on proposed guidance to the Policy Statement.

As discussed in Part I of this series, state DAO LLC laws have been enacted in the last several years and have become one option for decentralized autonomous organizations (or DAOs) to create a so-called “legal wrapper” or real-world corporate entity to shield individual members from liability.

In Part II we will look at some of the standout features of the United States’ DAO laws.[1]

DAOs as LLCs, or LLDs. As discussed below, the Wyoming (SF0038, codified at W.S. §17‑31‑101 through §17‑31‑116; Wyoming Governor Mark Gordon signed an amendment to the DAO Supplement into law (SF0068) (the DAO Supplement and its 2022 amendments) (collectively, the “WY Law”)  and Tennessee (HB2645/SB2854, to be codified at Tenn. Code Ann. §48-250-101 through 48-250-115) (the “TN Law”), DAO LLC laws opt for the “wrapper” approach by “wrapping” DAOs within an LLC. Utah, however, goes further. Under the “Utah Decentralized Autonomous Organizations Act” (HB 357) (codified at Utah Code Ann. §48-5-101 – 406) (the “Utah Law”), rather than being wrapped by an LLC, limited liability decentralized autonomous organizations (or “LLDs”) are the legal entity formed under the Utah Law. (Utah Code Ann. §48-5-104). Under the Utah Law, LLD members enjoy limited liability and are only liable for the on-chain contributions that the member has committed to the DAO. (Utah Code Ann. §48-5-202). Further, members cannot be held personally liable for any excess liability after the DAO assets have been exhausted. (Utah Code Ann. §48-5-202(1)(b)). Utah further covers situations when a DAO refuses to comply with an enforceable judgment or order against the DAO by stating that members who voted against using the DAO’s treasury to satisfy a judgment may be liable for any monetary payments in the judgment or order “in proportion to the member’s share of governance rights in the [DAO].” (Utah Code Ann. §48-5-202(d)(2)).  The Utah Law, in another effort to foreclose certain theories of liability, also explicitly states that a developer, member, participant or legal representative of a DAO may not be imputed to have fiduciary duties toward each other or third parties solely on account on their role, absent certain express actions or statements. (Utah Code Ann. §48-5-307).  These questions have been more salient for DAO members, given the ongoing CFTC enforcement against the Ooki DAO and the recent California district court ruling that various governance token holders in a DAO could be deemed to be members of a “general partnership” under California law and thus potentially joint and severally liable in the suit.