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Jonathan Mollod

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Jonathan P. Mollod is an attorney and content editor and a part of the firm’s Technology, Media and Telecommunications (TMT) Group. Jonathan earned his J.D. from Vanderbilt Law School. He focuses on issues involving technology, media, intellectual property and licensing issues and general online/tech law issues of the day.

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In July 2025, President Donald Trump signed the bipartisan-supported Guiding and Establishing National Innovation for U.S. Stablecoins Act (the “GENIUS Act” or the “Act”) into law. The GENIUS Act is the first major federal law that specifically regulates the cryptocurrency industry, establishing a comprehensive regulatory framework for payment stablecoins in the U.S. The Act, which will take effect by January 2027 (or earlier if final regulations implementing the Act are issued), significantly reshapes the legal landscape for digital assets in the U.S. and may provide momentum for further Congressional actions in the digital assets space.

Generally speaking, a stablecoin is a type of cryptocurrency designed to maintain a stable value by being pegged to a reserve asset, such as a fiat currency, a commodity, or a basket of reliable assets. Stablecoins aim to provide price stability, making them useful for everyday transactions, trading, and decentralized finance (DeFi) applications, including liquidity pools for collateral in lending and borrowing and as payments for low-cost borderless transactions. Stablecoins collectively represent hundreds of billions of dollars in market cap, underscoring the significance of the Genius Act’s goal to provide legal clarity and a structured framework for stablecoin issuance and oversight. The law also seeks to enhance trust and reduce the custodial and operational risks of stablecoins that were evidenced in recent years during a major algorithmic stablecoin collapse and a “depegging” incident of a major stablecoin. Overall, the law covers digital finance regulation, consumer protection, anti-money laundering (AML) compliance, federal and state regulatory frameworks, bankruptcy, and U.S. monetary policy in general.

To do this, the Act:

  • Formally defines “payment stablecoins”
  • Limits the integration of algorithmic stablecoins into the mainstream financial system and only recognizes fiat-backed stablecoins as permitted payment stablecoins
  • Establishes a federal licensing framework for domestic and foreign issuers
  • Sets standards for reserves and redemption and prohibits “rehypothecation”
  • Clarifies regulatory oversight between federal and state regulators and expressly states that licensed stablecoins are not securities or commodities
  • Enhances transparency and consumer protections, including in the event of issuer insolvency
  • Contains provisions related to anti-money laundering (AML) compliance
  • Seeks to legitimize stablecoins under U.S. law, incentivize the use of U.S. Treasury bonds as reserve assets and generally position the U.S. as a leader in digital finance

As the digital economy continues to evolve, the U.S. government and a handful of states are beginning to experiment with new strategies for financial resilience, including the creation of Strategic Bitcoin Reserves (“SBR”). An SBR is a financial policy tool where a government entity, such as a U.S. state, allocates a portion of assets to securely hold Bitcoin as a long-term store of value or hedge against economic risks like inflation. SBRs function similarly to traditional strategic reserves of assets like gold, as there is a finite supply of Bitcoin.[1] A government (or corporation or individual investor) might wish to add a non-sovereign asset like Bitcoin to their portfolio with the expectation that such assets will appreciate over time or at least maintain a relatively stable value. Recent SBR legislation passed in several states shows Bitcoin is increasingly being viewed as a long-term financial strategy rather than as a speculative asset. These laws also serve as a marketing strategy to position those states with SBRs as tech-friendly and pro-crypto – particularly in light of shifting priorities under the new administration.

According to a recent Bloomberg Law article [subscription required], in the past year there has been a sharp decline in active civil suits against cryptocurrency exchanges, digital wallet, mobile phone providers and others involving claims related to crypto hacking incidents or cybertheft, due, in part, to increased security protocols and…

Last month, the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) announced settled charges against three decentralized finance (DeFi) protocols for various registration and related violations under the Commodity Exchange Act (CEA) during the relevant period of investigation.  As a result, each entity paid a civil monetary penalty and agreed to cease violations of the CEA.  According to a statement by Commissioner Kristin N. Johnson, these latest settlements are the first time the CFTC charged a DeFi operator (e.g., Opyn, Inc. and Deridex, Inc.) with failing to register as a swap execution facility (SEF) or designated contract market (DCM). Moreover, these latest enforcements against DeFi entities arrive soon after the CFTC’s successful enforcement and default judgment against Ooki DAO, which the CFTC alleged was operating a decentralized blockchain-based software protocol that functioned in a manner similar to a trading platform and was violating the CEA (prior coverage of the Ooki DAO enforcement can be found here).

Way back (if we’re counting tech years) in 2014, artist Kevin McCoy (“McCoy”) created a digital record of his pulsating, octagon-shaped digital artwork Quantum on the Namecoin blockchain on May 2, 2014, thereby minting “the first NFT.” A lot has happened in the digital asset and NFT space since that…

In what appears to be an issue of first impression, a California district court ruled that various defendants allegedly holding governance tokens to the bZx DAO (or “Decentralized Autonomous Organization”), a protocol for tokenized margin trading and lending, could be deemed to be members of a “general partnership” under California law under the facts outlined in Plaintiffs’ complaint, and thus potentially joint and severally liable for negligence related to a phishing attack that resulted in the loss of users’ cryptocurrency. (Sarcuni v. bZx DAO, No. 22-618 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 27, 2023)). The ruling is significant given that this is purportedly the first court to substantively consider the legal status of a DAO under state law (albeit in a ruling on a motion to dismiss); interestingly, in a prior settlement the defendant bZeroX, LLC and its founders reached with the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) in 2022 over claims that bZeroX and its founders unlawfully offered leveraged and margined retail commodity transactions in digital assets, the order expressly considered the bZx DAO (and its successor Ooki DAO, which is co-defendant in the instant action) as an “unincorporated association” under federal law. (In re bZeroX, LLC, CFTC No. 22-31 (Sept. 22, 2022)).

A DAO is a decentralized autonomous organization where token holders can vote on governance decisions of the DAO. DAOs don’t typically operate within a formal corporate structure, opting instead to distribute governance rights among persons who hold a specific governance token. The entire raison d’être of a DAO is to take advantage of web3 technologies and operate without a traditional corporate formation to make decisions without a central authority or usual top-down management structure. While DAOs are emerging as a viable structure in DeFi space, this ruling shows that their non-traditional makeup may not necessarily be a shield from real world liability.  Plaintiffs’ theory that the DAO members are part of a general partnership means that anyone holding governance tokens at the relevant time would be jointly and severally liable for the torts of the DAO.  To be sure, even though existing structures do not fit the novel web3 organizational primitive that is a DAO, nothing prevented the bZx DAO (or its successor Ooki DAO), from creating a so-called “legal wrapper” or real-world corporate entity to shield individual members from liability and limit potential creditors to monetary recovery from the DAO’s treasury only.

The organizers of an initial coin offering (ICO) recently won dismissal of an investor’s fraud claims by establishing that their public risk disclosures negated the investor’s claims of reliance on alleged misstatements.  The project, a video service provider’s ICO, was governed by a purchase agreement called a “Simple Agreement for Future Tokens” (“SAFT”).   The plaintiff investor later lost his entire investment as the token collapsed, allegedly due to the provider’s decision to scrap its initial plans for a decentralized platform and move to a permissioned blockchain (and also the provider’s choice to seek additional capital via a “Regulation A” public offering).  The New York court found that even if certain representations made by the issuer regarding the prospect of a decentralized network were actionable, the Plaintiff had not plausibly alleged  “reasonable reliance” on such representations in signing the SAFT. (Rostami v. Open Props, Inc., No. 22-03326 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 9, 2023)).

This past month, a California district court granted a motion to compel arbitration of various claims by customers of cryptocurrency exchange platform, Coinbase Global, Inc. (“Coinbase”), finding that Coinbase’s User Agreement, which contains a broad arbitration provision, including a delegation clause that delegates questions of arbitrability to the arbitrator.  (Donovan v. Coinbase Global, Inc., No. 22-02826 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 6, 2023)). Unlike some electronic contracting disputes, which turn on whether the user had adequate notice of the terms and manifested consent to such terms (a ruling which often involves an examination of a site or app’s screen display and whether the user is reasonably presented with notice that completing a transaction will bind the user to terms of service), the account holders in this case did not dispute that they had agreed to the User Agreement, rather they argued that the arbitration provision and delegation clauses were unconscionable and unenforceable.